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Abstract
In this paper, supply chain decision-makers where and how to internationally invest into supply
chains. I focus on outside institutional factors, and intra-firm behavioral factors that affect
where and how they invest. I first review the literature on international investment at large.
Later for my part of the research, I conduct a series of semi-structured interviews with
international supply chain decision-maker primarily in Denver to better understand their
processes. I find that they value business models higher than “hunches”, but also that tacit
knowledge and relationships play an important role in their processes.
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SECTION 1: The Set Up

Introduction
It is not hard to see how the items we use every day come from all around the world.
Think of the clothes we wear, the food we eat. It is likely that if we look at the product labels of
all the items in our living rooms, that we will see items from dozens of countries. Going one
step further, it is likely that we will see that many of these items contain smaller parts which
come from every corner of the earth. Consider our electronics, cars, and appliances. More than
any other time in history, products tend to be a multinational mélange of smaller parts. Where
do these parts come from? Who put them all together? How did they get to us? The answer is
by and through a supply chain.
This is not new information. Supply chains are commonplace in today’s world, and they
are frequently brought up in the news, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. What is
interesting is not so much the fact that a product is made of many different parts that originate
across the earth and found their way to a consumer. It is more the question “Why?”. Why are
certain parts made where they are? Why are certain countries picked for manufacturing in one
area of the supply chain, but not another? Why are goods shipped through this route and not
another? The answer comes down to the fact that a group of people in a firm make choices
about each intricate detail of the supply chain that led it to look the way it does. The question
then becomes “Why do these people make the choices they do?”. I believe there are multiple
factors that influence these choices. There is probably a rational process these decision makers
follow. This could be an elaborate data-driven business models for how these choices are made
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or possibly a system the decision maker has devised over time from experience. There are also
outside factors that probably impact these decisions. These could be the political and economic
policies or factor endowment of resources of the countries where a firm might be considering
adding an element to their supply chain.
This paper will be focused on decision-making processes involved in the allocation of
international supply chain investment. These are the intra-firm decision-making processes and
outside institutional factors that affect where and how international supply chain decisionmakers invest. When studying the effect of these variables, I especially pay attention to how
they go about mitigating uncertainty, as certainty is the most important vector in supply chain
policy. I do this through a series of semi-structured interviews with decision-makers in this field,
primarily in the Denver area. Hopefully, this analysis will help to paint a clearer picture of the
process of international supply chain investment.

Statement of Purpose
Before diving into my project, I want to explain my rationale for researching my topic in
effort to persuade readers of its importance.
There are three key reasons as to why I believe that research into the intra-firm
behavioral factors that affect the allocation of international investment in supply chains is
important. The first reason is that it is extremely relevant. During the COVID-19 pandemic,
supply chains were hit extremely hard, especially in the United States. As noted in the
introduction it has become a topic seen daily in the news. The supply chain meltdown makes
my topic interesting. More importantly, people and companies depend on supply chains. The
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scale of this dependence renders the decision-making processes behind supply chains worth
understanding.
Another reason this research topic is important is because international investment is
undertheorized, especially regarding supply chains. Historically, models of international
investment were adjacent offshoots of international trade theory. These were Ricardo’s
Comparative Advantage theory of international trade, Linder’s Hypothesis, and notably (as
addressed in my literature review) the Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem. Recently, empirical models of
finance have come from Behavioral Finance. The focus of these models is usually domestic and
tends to be on Wall Street type finance, not cross-border business investment. With all of this
in mind, there exists a major gap in the economic literature which I hope to help fill to some
extent with my research, creating a better understanding of the world from an economic
viewpoint. This brings me to my final reason. Policymakers, be they regulatory or business
leaders, need more understanding of the decision-making environment to make better choices
regarding international supply chain investment. There have been calls for a reevaluation of
supply chain strategy. Decision makers are wondering if there should be more space in supply
chain overhauls so they will be less susceptible to shocks. There are also calls to bring supply
chains closer to home (IMD 2020), making more of the supply chain domestic via “nearshoring”
instead of offshoring. To understand the effects of any new policy, we must first understand
how the processes currently work. My goal is to explore these processes, with a focus on the
decision-making strategies and variables that matter in international supply chain investment.
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Thesis Layout
This project is laid out into seven sections. Following this introductory section, section 2
surveys the existing literature on investment decision-making. Section 3 shows why
international supply chain investment is unique among different types of investment and why it
is worth exploring the processes behind it. Section 4 explains my research methodology and
interview strategy and establishes a number of hypotheses I employ to structure my
investigation. Section 5 showcases key findings from my interviews and organizes quotes into
three important theoretical groups, discussing their practical implications and how they relate
to the existing literature. Section 6 assesses my hypotheses, lays out a few areas for further
research, and concludes the project.
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SECTION 2: A Survey of the Investment Decision-Making Literature
Before I turn the focus of this project towards supply chains directly, it is first important
to review the literature on economic decision-making generally and more specifically that
related to international investment. Supply-chains are notably missing from this literature.
While some of the theory presented here may be applicable to international supply chain
decision-making, one aim of this section is to show that existing theory is insufficient to cover
the complexity of decision-making in international supply chain investment.

Economic Decision-Making
Risk and Uncertainty in Investment and Economics
From the very early days of economics, risk, uncertainty, and emotional disposition have
been noted as important and sometimes driving factors in economic decision-making (Smith
1761). At the start of modern economics, John Maynard Keynes, in The General Theory, placed
uncertainty, risk, and emotions front and center, especially with regard to investment (Keynes
1936). Much of Keynes’s argument in this seminal work relates to the ways that investment
drives the economy. Where capital is allocated today will drive where production takes place is
tomorrow, and where production takes place tomorrow will drive where consumption occurs
day after tomorrow. Keynes argues that much of this investment is driven by the combination
of decision-makers’ evaluation of risk and uncertainty, as well as their animal spirits. For Keynes
animals spirits is a proxy word for emotion. Notable behavioral economists have embraced the
term and have applied it to cognitive biases and human psychology (Akerlof and Shiller 2010).
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Risk and uncertainty are intrinsically important to investment. People and firms have come up
with many ways to deal with risk and uncertainty, but at times, it can be overwhelming. This is
where Herbert Simon’s notion of bounded rationality becomes important (Simon 1982). That is,
the world can be almost infinitely complex and humans, while relatively rational, have distinct
limits on their ability to create rational sense out of things and respond accordingly.
Bounded rationality mirrors the behavioral economics’ idea of ‘heuristics’ in decisionmaking. Heuristics are a type of cognitive bias and a way of dealing with problems that are too
complex for a decision-maker to rationally respond to. If a situation is too complex, people
instead respond as if they are faced with a different, though similar problem, that is simpler and
less complex. Heuristics have been made famous by Nobel Prize winning Daniel Kahneman
(Kahneman 2011). Another area in economics is the economics of information. Pioneered by
Joseph Stiglitz, asymmetric information can act as a bound on rationality and can lead to
decision-makers making choices that are seemingly suboptimal (Stiglitz 2000). Stiglitz’s and
Kahneman’s contributions to economics provide evidence to confirm Simon’s original model of
bounded rationality.
The model of bounded rationality, which predated the studies of heuristics and
asymmetric information, influenced Simon’s theory of firm decision-making in Administrative
Behavior (Simon 1997) and Cyert and March’s notable Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Cyert and
March 1992). These works later went on to be highly influential in the international business
field and are frequently mentioned in the supply chain literature.
Large-scale macroeconomic uncertainty and risk have been modeled mathematically in
the areas of trade and financial crisis. It has been found that examples of bounded rationality
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and heuristics are present in international trade policy and execution (Freund and Özden 2008).
In their work A Crisis of Beliefs, Gennaioli and Shleifer quantitatively model the psychological
and economic roots of the 2008 global financial crisis (Gennaioli and Shleifer 2018). This work is
a landmark study in behavioral macroeconomics and shows that the concepts of Simon,
Kahneman, Cyert, and March are not isolated to small scale decision-making, and help us
understand economic behavior in the global economy. They are also important for
understanding international supply chain decision-making, though they have not yet been
applied theoretically to this subject.

Mainstream Economics: The Neoclassical Perspective
Neoclassical economics has historically favored of simpler models in which humans are
almost always able to optimize decisions when allocating investments. An important moment in
the development of these models was when John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern
presented the mathematical proofs and assumptions of Expected Utility Theory (Von Neumann
and Morgenstern 2007). Included in these axioms are the assumptions and proofs related to
rational human economic behavior. Important for our discussion are the axioms of
completeness and transitivity. Explained simply, completeness assumes that an individual has a
defined set of preferences. Transitivity refers to the assumption that preferences are consistent
across multiple options. These axioms allowed economists to build models that were concise
and consistent, even if lacking empirical validity. These axioms are logically consistent but do
not fully account for how people act in the real world. Peoples’ preferences are often fluid, not
logically consistent within themselves, and dependent on framing and mood. This does not
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mean that Von Neuman and Morgenstern’s axioms are wrong per se. When the writers wrote
these axioms, they only stated that individuals will only conform to expected utility theory if
they also conform to the axioms of completeness and transitivity. A problem arises when other
theories build on expected utility theory and do not explicitly recognize the limits of the
axiomatic assumptions of Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s argument.
The Efficient Markets Hypothesis and the theory of Rational Expectations are more
closely tied to international investment decisions. Although these two ideas have had their
share of pushback, especially since the 2008 Financial Crisis, they are still two of the most
popular theories regarding investment. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis states that asset
prices will always reflect all available information (Fama 1970). This would mean that the asset
prices within supply chains are all completely determined by agent enjoying access to all
available information. Rational Expectations theory similarly states that agents in an economic
model will on average act as if they use all available information in making decisions (Muth
1961). So, assuming rational expectations, firms will allocate their investment in supply chains
based on what is most advantageous for the company. In other words, what will make them the
most money in the timeframe they select. In both theories there is no room for institutional
norms, business culture, biases and heuristics, or international cultural differences, all of which
are important in decisions made about international supply chains.
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Behavioral Individual Level Investment Choice

Figure 1: Prospect Theory Value Function

In contrast to mainstream economic models of decision-making, behavioral economic
models are built from data. Behavioral economics incorporates psychology to improve the realworld validity of economic models. Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) is widely
credited as the beginning of the behavioral economic movement in decision-making theory.
The most important insight of Prospect Theory is its value function, seen in Figure 1. In contrast
to Expected Utility Theory, the value function is nonlinear and is steeper on the left side of the
Y-axis than on the right side. This signifies that losses are weighted heavier than gains, meaning
that people are loss averse. Building on this, people generally are also risk averse because they
do not see an equivalent change in value between an equivalent loss and gain. This is especially
true of mid-level managers in firms as they are more likely to be blamed for losses than they
are to be praised for gains (Willman et al. 2002). This has implications for supply-chain
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investment decisions. Managers often make supply chain decisions and are blamed if the
outcome of these decisions are poor, but not praised if the outcome is profitable. Risk and loss
aversion lead to corporate conservativism in investments and would seem to have a direct
impact on the allocation of investment in supply chains.
With the above research in mind, there has been alternative behavioral economic
research that shows that emotional regulation may have a role in investment decision-making.
Emotional regulation refers to people’s ability to control their emotions. In “The
Psychophysiology of Real-Time Financial Risk Processing” (Lo and Repin 2002), physical
correlates of negative emotion are observed in financial investors when they encounter
decisions with high levels of risk. In the same study, the researchers noted that those who
invested most successfully were those who were also most successful in managing these
emotions. This would suggest that emotional regulation has a role in the success of financial
investment decisions. Further, in “Thinking like a trader selectively reduces individuals' loss
aversion” (Sokol-Hessner et al. 2009), the authors show that when people think of individual
investments as a part of a broader portfolio they experience less loss aversion and are more
likely to exhibit risk-taking behavior. Extended more broadly, these studies have implications in
international supply chain investment decision-making. Prospect Theory suggests that decisionmakers in firms are loss averse and may be risk averse in their decisions. The Sokol-Hessner et.
al and Lo and Repin studies suggest that Prospect Theory provide useful insights into the way
that people handle loss aversion, revealing the influences on their investment strategies and
relative success. Behavioral Economics has much to offer to decision-making theory but has not
paid particular attention to international contexts – the subject of the next section.
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International Investment Decision-Making
The Heckscher-Ohlin Theorem
One mainstream economic model important in international investment is not a theory
of investment, but a theory of international trade that has investment allocation implications.
The Heckscher-Ohlin ( H-O) theorem is a model of international trade that focuses on country
factor endowments and product factor intensiveness (Ohlin 1933). In the model there will be
two countries, one labor abundant and one capital abundant, two goods, one labor intensive
and one capital intensive, and two factors, labor and capital. The labor abundant country will
specialize in the production and trade in the product that uses labor intensively. The reverse is
the case for capital. The model has been extended further in the factor-price equalization
theorem to explain the optimum prices, trade, and investment allocation in any given H-O
scenario (Stolper and Samuelson 1941). Although a model of international trade, this explicitly
states where production investment will be allocated. In terms of supply chain investment, it
would suggest that firms’ decisions on where to allocate this investment would largely depend
on the relative factor endowment of labor and capital in the country of said investment. While
this model’s validity has been questioned for many years (Leontief 1953), it is still an important
model that is commonplace in mainstream economics.

Behavioral FDI
While the economic literature of behavioral investment and decision-making is
immense, the economic literature that specifically focusses on international investment
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behavior is sparse. Built off a previous capital-difficulty gap model (Heiner 1983), there has
been a model theorized that adds behavioral economic elements and also economically models
uncertainty (Hosseini 2005). This model has been used in a few tests of FDI investor behavior to
see if they exhibit any heuristics in their investing strategies. One study did this by examining
the behavior of Turkish investors in Ethiopia (Sözer Oran and Ali 2018). It found that the
heuristics herding, representativeness, regret aversion and mental accounting had a statistically
significant impact on investor behavior. Another study looked into the methods of Portuguese
supply chain FDI managers through surveys to find out if they exhibited heuristics in their
investment strategy (Pinheiro-Alves 2011). That study found that the investors did in fact
exhibit heuristics in their decision making, but more importantly, found that investors relied
more on heuristics and biases when the degree of uncertainty was higher. This confirms aspects
of the Heiner model and is consistent with other behavioral economics literature. While these
studies are important and interesting to the topic international supply chain decision-making,
they do not explain firm decision-making as much as they try to model the observed firm
behavior. I will have to turn to another area of the literature to directly explore the decisionmaking aspects of choice more fully in international investment into supply chains.

International Business Literature
Having reviewed the mainstream understandings of international investment and
decision-making, in addition to the behavioral economic underpinnings of decision-making and
the view of risk and uncertainty in economics, I will turn to the International Business literature
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and how it describes how decision makers make international investment decisions regarding
risk and uncertainty.
In the International Business literature, it is frequently noted that there is a
heterogeneity in firm risk taking in international investment decisions. A proposed explanation
for the phenomenon is that there is both destination country institutional/political risk, and
also risk preferences and propensity held by managers that make the investment decisions
(Buckley et al. 2016). This suggests that country and outside institutional factors do matter and
should be studied but are not the only factor that attract or scare off international investment.
It also explains why there are such differences in investment into a single country that,
obviously, holds the same level of country-wide risk. If managers have different risk
propensities, they will evaluate the destination country risk differently and make different
decisions accordingly. Further research shows that the level of risk of a manager’s home
country plays a role in their risk propensity for investment in other countries. It appears that
managers’ home country satisfaction in decisions of risk has a positive effect on their
controllable (legally-protected) risk propensity, but a negative effect on their propensity of risk
is contingent on fundamentally uncertain variables like institutional instability (Buckley et al.
2018).
Focusing in on the managerial decision-making processes, applications from Real
Options theory are common in the international business literature related to supply chain
decisions. Real Options theory branched out from Expected Net Present Value theory which is
an intertemporal decision-making tool for initial investment. It weighs the initial cost of capital
investment against expected cash flow (discounted for time and uncertainty). If the total is
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positive, it is a good project to undertake. If it is negative, the firm should avoid undertaking the
project. If it is zero, then it does not matter either way if the project is undertaken. Real Options
theory expands on this and allows for firm options after the initial investment has already
happened. For example, a question in Real Options theory could be, “should a firm continue
production in a facility, or should they switch production to a different facility?”. It has been
observed that managerial executives use Real Options theory in supply chain decisions (Hult,
Craighead, and Ketchen 2010). It has also been shown that Real Options theory does a better
job than older theories in explaining international investment behavior due to its allowance for
new and continual options after initial capital investment (Song, Makhija, and Kim 2015).
Supply chain organizational knowledge is being shared between firms and industries to improve
effectiveness and efficiency (Miles and Snow 2007), and it appears that utilizing Real Options
theory is a part of this knowledge.
It has been outlined that there is a need for increased behavioral research in the study
of supply chain decision-making (Tokar 2010) as it is imperative for understanding how
managers assess risk and how they employ Real Options theory. It is also of note that
behavioral factors play a role in external intuitional variables that affect the choice of
investment allocation in supply chains. If broadened to include more factor endowments than
just labor and capital such as human capital, an extended H-O theorem has been shown to
account for much investment in East Asia in the later 20th century and early 21st century
(Brooks, Roland-Holst, and Zhai 2008). When looking into risk and uncertainty in international
investment in supply chains, it is imperative to study the intra-firm behavioral decision-making
processes that affect this investment. This is the gap my research is exploring.
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Contract Theory
An additional area of importance in the organizational theory/business and economics
literature is contract theory. Each piece of a supply chain can be thought to include two parties.
The first party is the buyer. The buyer is usually a firm that is selling some sort of finished or
intermediary good. They are the ones investing in the supply chain. The other party is the
vendor. The vendor is selling either raw goods or a small portion of the completed good that
will be sold by the buyer. A good example of a product a supply chain vendor might sell would
be steering wheels to a major car manufacturer or semiconductors to a phone or computer
manufacturer. Contracts are important because they are the formal agreement between the
two parties regarding the amount and pricing of the good that the vendor sells to the buyer in
addition to any specific contingencies that either party may desire to be addressed. Contracts
add an element of certainty and predictability in supply chains, but they cannot do this
completely. Simon’s idea of bounded rationality, Stiglitz’s asymmetric information, and
Keynes’s fundamental uncertainty are all still quite present in the world of contracts, especially
international supply chain investment contracts.
Incomplete contracts come into existence because it is usually impractical and probably
impossible for contracting parties include all possible relevant contingencies into the contracts
they create (Hart and Moore 1988). This is even more likely in an international context where
there are countless variables to consider, and uncertainty abounds. Although the reality of the
existence of incomplete contracts may seem like an issue at first glance, many in the field argue
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that they are often preferable to more rigid contracts in reacting to changes that may occur in
raw material pricing or large economic changes. Including strict fixed price controls in contracts
can negatively impact the level of collaboration between the vendor and buyer which leads to
inefficiency and blockages within supply chains (Morgan, Doran, and Morgan 2018). Zhao,
Zhang, and Cheng showed that partially incomplete contracts increased central supply chain
productivity because they allowed for renegotiation as real production cost differs from
projected production cost (Zhao, Zhang, and Cheng 2020). In this way, incomplete contracts
mirror Real Options Theory. They allow for reassessment after an initial decision is made. The
optimal decision can change over time as changes in inputs occur or changes in firm goals and
direction occur. In a longitudinal case study of a supply chain vendor and buyer, Coltman et al.
(2009) showed how a large readjustment in the contract between the vendor and buyer led to
a more efficient outcome that benefited both parties considerably. In the era of COVID-19, it
has only become more obvious that sudden major world changes can occur at any time.
Because of this some are arguing that incomplete contracts suit the real world better than
stricter contracts (Cummins, Kauffman, and Choi 2021).
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SECTION 3: Why are Supply Chains Special?
Part of what is being argued in this project is that international supply chain investment
is undertheorized in International Economics because we do not understand the decisionmaking processes that go into this type of investment. In this section, I argue that international
supply chain decision-making is unique compared to that of other types of investment. This is
due to several key factors, enabled by its history, that separate it from other types of
investment. I will first show how the transformation from localized production to international
supply chains allowed for these unique aspects to arise then compare international supply
chain investment to other types of investment.

A Brief History of International Supply Chain Decision-Making
To understand the complexities of international supply chains, it is necessary to
understand where they came from. In this, we will see how recent a creation the international
supply chain system is and how revolutionary compared to its predecessor. . This brief history
will help give an understanding as to why decision-making in international supply chains may be
novel compared to other types of investment decision-making.
The system of global production before the international supply chain revolution was
namely one of production clustered in the Global North with products dispersed globally. This
marked a continuation of the colonial trend of industrialization of the Global North and
deindustrialization in the Global South (Baldwin 2012) . After WWII, the United States, and later
Japan, were the workshops of the world. Due to the complexity of the coordination of
largescale manufacturing, its decision-making tended to be localized. A good example is heavy
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top-down corporate decision-making in the automotive industry of the United States being
localized in the city of Detroit (Liu 2020). Many industries tended to look like this. The decisions
were made locally and corporately because the costs of communication and coordination
across large distances and many individuals was so great.
A major shift occurred in the 1980’s which led to a transformation in global production.
This shift was the ICT revolution. It eliminated the main constraining factor keeping supplychains highly localized - long distance communication costs. This has been called the Second
Unbundling of Globalization which for supply chains meant two things: “The ICT revolution
made it possible to coordinate complexity at distance” and “the vast wage differences between
developed and developing nations made separation profitable” (Baldwin 2012).
This led to the internationalization of supply chains coordinated by “headquarter
economies”. This means that decisions about procurement and investment were now made by
decision-makers who were very far away from where their investments were going. Decisions
were also made in a less centralized way. The ICT revolution made it easier for individuals to
communicate without as many barriers. This made the delegation of supply chain decisions
possible, and supply chain managers and procurement investors became standard positions in
manufacturing companies. This means that individuals have large sway in the decisions being
made and makes supply chains more comparable to other types of investment. But it is still
novel in that is highly complex/uncertain and yet allows for a relatively high level of flexibility.
This will be explored thoroughly in this next part of Section 3.
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International Supply Chain Investment is Unique
In the following I will show how supply chain investment is unique among several other
key types of investment: traditional foreign direct investment, short-term portfolio investment,
and long-term debt investment.

Uncertainty and Flexibility

UNCERTAINTY

FLEXIBILITY

Low

Low Long-Term Debt Investment

High

Short-Term Portfolio
Investment

High

Standard FDI

Supply Chain
Investment

Figure 2: The Uncertainty-Flexibility Nexus
Supply chain investment rests in a special quadrant of the nexus between flexibility and

uncertainty. Flexibility, for the sake of this study, means the ability to change the makeup of the
investment relatively quickly. It can be thought of as the inverse of “lock-in”. When a long-term
debt investment is taken on, a defining characteristic is lock-in. These are commonly corporate
or treasury bonds that reach maturation after at least one year, often five or ten years. This is
quite different than most short-term portfolio investments, in particular equities. It is not
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uncommon to see the make-up of a short-term portfolio drastically change in the matter of a
week or even a day. Supply chains see a similarly high level of high flexibility (albeit probably
less that short term portfolio investment, but I am speaking relatively), especially when
compared to traditional foreign direct investment. When supply chain decision-makers invest, it
is usually a procurement investment. They are spending money to add an existing supplier,
manufacturer, or distributor into their supply chain. This contrasts with traditional foreign
direct investment which looked more like an agreement to simply build a factory in a foreign
country. Supply chains shift by adding or subtracting various elements. They have a relatively
low level of lock-in, especially compared to traditional FDI.
On the other side of this nexus is uncertainty. While all these types of investments
involve some level of fundamental uncertainty, what I mean here by uncertainty is long- run

uncertainty about the world. Long-run debt investment largely seeks to separate itself from
uncertainty through fixed maturation. Some may take issue with my classification of short-term
portfolio investment as having relatively low levels of uncertainty. While it is true that markets
can change on a dime and that it can be hard to pick winners in equity, short-term portfolio
investment mitigates a large amount of uncertainty simply by being short-term. Next week or
tomorrow holds much more certainty than a decade from now. This separates it from foreign
direct investment and supply chain investment in that both are more global involving many
people and environments, and they are on a longer timetable. These two factors, especially in
combination, create relatively high levels of uncertainty for these types of investment. Not to
jump the gun, but a quote from the research I conducted summarizes the uncertainty and
complexity of supply chain investment well,
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“Your topic here is extremely complicated. Starting up a manufacturing
investment is extremely difficult. Probably one of the most significant things you
can do other than a merger acquisition of a major company. I mean,
it's extremely (complicated). It takes years and years and has all these variables
that are constantly being adjusted”
Both uncertainty and flexibility affect and constrain the decisions one makes. Supply
chain investment sits in a unique quadrant of the uncertainty/flexibility nexus. It sees both high
levels of uncertainty and flexibility. It has the advantage of options and many choices, - a
characteristic of flexibility - in a similar way to short-term portfolio investment. Yet, it does do
with longer-term goals that may be aided by or destroyed by an everchanging world. One of the
key differences between supply-chain investment and traditional foreign direct investment

versus long-term debt investment and short-term portfolio investment is the goal in mind. For
the latter two, both securities, the goal is for the investments themselves to increase in value
and bring profit. This is not the case with the former two. The goal for FDI and supply chain
investment is to achieve greater long-run profitability to a firm. This latter goal is more complex
and opens it up to a greater level of uncertainty. But supply-chain investment is different from
traditional FDI in that it has the benefit of a much lower level of lock-in. Investments are rarely
static in supply chains. There is room for them to be changed over time.
What does supply chain investment’s unique character mean for the decision-making
processes involved? I suspect it means we will see either a combination of strategies used by
short-term portfolio investment decision makers and by traditional foreign direct investment
decision makers. Both have been covered in Section 2 at some level. Much of Behavioral
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Economics and Behavioral Finance has focused on short-term portfolio investment. Part of the
goal of this project is to see to what degree the strategies of international supply chain
investment decision-makers fall in line with this existing field of literature. I suspect that it will
to some degree, but that we will also find novel and unique strategies used.
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SECTION 4: Methodology
Methodology/Research Design
The methodology for my research is greatly inspired by a study done by (Fenton‐
O’Creevy et al. 2011). They conducted surveys of securities traders in several London
brokerages to see the role of emotion in their decision-making. My research style is similar. I
conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with international supply chain decisionmakers in the Denver area. Due to the smaller scope of this project, it is an undergraduate
honors thesis after all, it is not by any means a comprehensive study. I interviewed five
international supply chain decision-makers, primarily based in Denver (one in Sao Paulo) and all
working for Denver-based firms. Their roles varied from Vice President to Consultant to Supply
Chain Manager. This is not a statistically significant sample, but for the goals and style of my
research, I believe this is acceptable. My interviews were based on a series of questions
provided to each participant. Many of the questions centered around decision-making
processes and tools, but also questions about COVID-19 in supply chains and international
variables were included. I felt these were both necessary in understanding their decisionmaking processes even if they were not strictly decision-making questions. All listed questions
were asked in each interview, but conversations varied. The interviews were conversational in
nature.
This project should be categorized as exploratory research. The goal in mind is to better
understand international supply chain decision-making and to fill the gaps in Economics
regarding international supply chains. Before we can go about closing the gaps, we need to
know what is even worth researching within international supply chain decision-making.
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How I attempt to do this is by listening to how people in the field talk about their
decision-making processes and synthesize that into an International Economics and DecisionMaking theory perspective. From this, I can find topics that are interesting for further research.
I show these areas of interest in Section 5 by organizing quotes into key topic areas and fitting
them into groups of ideas. My hypotheses going into the interviews were split into three main
groups: that participants would follow “gut feelings” to a significant degree, that participants
would rely heavily on data and business models, or that participants would synthesize these
two. My last potential hypothesis turned out to be most correct, but the story is more
interesting than I imagined.

Formal Questions Asked in Interviews
Participant Information Questions

1. In what industry do you work?
Manufacturing, Tech, Finance, Consulting, Energy, Other (please specify)

2. What is your role is exactly?
E.g., Investor, Investment Advisor, Researcher, Independent Decision Maker, Team
Member, Manager, Director, Other (please specify)

Free Response Questions

1. What country level factors play a role in where you would choose to invest or disinvest
regarding your supply chain?

2. To what extent do precise cost/quality issues play a role is sourcing adjustment?
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3. To what degree does your intuition based on experience inform the decisions you
make?
4. To what degree do company norms and policies inform the decisions you make?
5. To what degree do your “hunches” affect your investment choices?
6. How do you evaluate potential risks in your supply chain investment?
7. What do you do to mitigate uncertainty in supply and potential bottlenecks?
8. Is there a need for more flexibility in supply chains? If so, how can this be achieved?
9. Has Covid-19 changed the parameters of how you think about supply chain investment,
organization, contracts, and contingencies?

Ranking Questions

1. Rank the following from most to least important in your decision-making processEconomic Models, Industry Reports, Company Policy, Intuition, Company Norms,
Informal Benchmarks, “Hunches”, Past Experience

2. Rank the following country level institutional variables from most to least important
regarding international supply chain investmentPolitical Risk, Proximity to other parts of supply chain, Similarity to home country,
Economic and Tax policy, Environmental Factors, Infrastructure,
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SECTION 5: Interviews and Discussion
In this section, I report the findings from the interviews I conducted. I break quotes into
three different parts which correspond with a general topic. Part 1 will cover what participants
said about outside international factors that affect the choices they make regarding their supply
chains. Part 2, the bulk of Section 5, covers their decision-making strategies. This part is broken
into three smaller groups: business models/technology, intuition and tacit knowledge, and
contracts/relationships. I believe part 2 is the most important piece of this entire project.
Finally, it would have been remiss had I not asked participants about COVID-19, so part 3
records their thoughts about how the COVID-19 pandemic has affected international supply
chain decision-making.

Part 1: Outside International Factors
Though this project is largely focused on internal decision-making variables that affect
the allocation of international supply chain investment, it would be remiss if I did not include a
section about how participants talked of external factors that play a role in their investment
decision-making processes. Think back to Figure 2 from Section 3, the nexus of uncertainty and
flexibility. The effect of outside international factors is where international supply chain
investment is more like traditional FDI than it is to short-term portfolio investment.
Government policy, factor endowments, and culture are all factors that have been theorized to
influence international investment and trade. In this subsection I cover how participants talked
about each of these three factors.
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Government Policy
It was clear from the interviews that supply chain decision-makers agree that the
government policy of wherever they are considering investing plays a role in how the choice is
made. In fact, from the ranking questions, for outside international factors, political risk was
consistently ranked in the top three and economic and tax policy was ranked in the top two by
four of the five participants. Government policies matter. Consider the following statement
made by a participant:
“I think the one thing that affected us the most recently, well besides COVID, was
the tariffs. The tariffs that happened several years ago have been the biggest
factor outside of COVID here in the last four years. It is very significant. Our
business had not seen such massive change in international trade until that
happened.”
As the largest factor outside of COVID-19 this signifies something immensely important,
although, this same participant noted that there is a degree of relativity in the level of
importance of government policies. When asked if natural resources or labor costs and supply
are much bigger factors than government policy in general, they responded with
“It depends, right? It depends if you're talking about a country that is strongly
opposed to manufacturing. That would probably trump the environmental
natural supply chain and labor factors.”
The importance of government policy appears to be dictated by the political direction of the
policy. This is understandable. If a particular government is strongly anti-manufacturing or
strongly anti-trade/foreign investment, it follows that if it acts on these political leanings, the
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policies it enacts will be important for international supply chain decision-makers. The
importance of government policy is more a question of relevance. Governments’ make all sorts
of policies that bear no relevance to international supply chains. When they make policies that
are relevant, like the massive increase in US/China tariffs, then they start to increase in
importance. It is also worth mentioning that because relevant policies are driven by different
local politics, some governments tend to be more important than others,
“If you want to do manufacturing in China, the government is absolutely more
important than the private sector. In the United States, it's probably the other
way around, and Europe's kind of in between. Developing nations where it's more
of focus on the business side.”
What kind of government policies did participants single out as ones that will affect their
investments? Participants mentioned several explicit government policies such as taxation and
business regulation. What they mentioned more were factors that may result from government
policy over time. These are factors like number of ports and sophistication of port
infrastructure, road infrastructure, airport sophistication and access, and average level of
education in the workforce. Participants noted that these latter factors trump explicit
government policies. What is interesting is that this inverts the assumptions behind many
neoliberal policy recommendations for attracting investment. Low taxes and less regulation
may be appreciated by businesses seeking to invest parts of their supply chain into a given
country, but these policies are not the critical variables. Infrastructure is far more important to
a supply chain investor than a tax break. This may lend credence to more heterodox economic
views that suggest that neoliberal structural adjustment policies are not helpful and that may
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argue for greater government spending on infrastructure. With this said, there are a few key
caveats to this assertion which have to do with factors endowments, considered in the next
subsection.

Factor Endowments
The idea that factor endowments are a determinant of trade and investment has its
origins in the Heckscher-Ohlin model discussed in Section 3. In their model, labor and capital
were the only two factors. Since their model came out in 1933, other factors have been added
and seen as important. These include natural resources, knowledge capital, and technological
capacities ( Stern and Maskus 1981; Carr, Markusen, and Maskus 2001). For this section, I do
take a broader view of factor endowments which includes infrastructure. I do not assert that
these factors are completely fixed, as policy can play a role in changing factor endowments, but
they are relatively fixed, especially from the perspective of an international supply chain
investor. I also include physical location as an endowed factor. Participants tended to
emphasize endowed factors, especially infrastructure, over short-term government tax or
regulatory policy. In particular they emphasized physical location as a key factor. The following
quote illustrates the importance of relative factor endowments compared to government policy
well,
“There's a lot of things that go into where you want to source your products. In
economics they probably tell you things like government. You know, local
regulation, labor force, all those types of things… We're always looking for a best
cost country. What makes sense for us in terms of raw material availability, local
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ports, airports access to ship our stuff around the world, what does that do to our
lead time where our customers are huge.”
Note that the participant emphasized the importance of the factor endowment of natural
resources and infrastructure over regulation. What is more interesting is the comment about
lead time. Participants consistently mentioned proximity towards the rest of their supply chain
as a key factor,
“We typically, not always, but typically follow our customers. If they're going to
open a new location or expand in the UK, or Russia, we might choose to expand
with them, or our competitor may choose to expand with them regardless of
some of that political environment there is. There's some limit to the risks the
corporation will take, even for any customer, but generally speaking, we aren't
going into Serbia, for example, without a customer.”
From this comment, and others that echoed the same sentiment, it is reasonable to say that
supply chain decision-making (from an outside international variable viewpoint) may fall into
line with an altered version of the Gravity Model of International Trade. It asserts that
international trade between countries is determined by the economic size countries and
distance between them (Isard et al. 2017). If this were applied to supply chain investment, it
may look like asserting that the amount of supply chain investment into a given country from
another may be determined in large part by the existing amount of supply chain investment
into that country and distance between other parts of the supply chain. Based on the
interviews I conducted it would make sense to supplement such a model with relative factor
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endowment insights from the H-O model and its successors, and a small amount of weight
should be given to tax and regulatory policy.

Culture
It would be remiss if I had not asked participants about international cultural factors
that play a role in their decision-making about supply chains. It was clear, generally, that
cultural differences did not play a large role in the procurement part of international supply
chain investment. Participants cared more about government policy differences than they did
about differences in culture,
“There's more interchangeability (in terms of business policy) when you say Czech
Republic versus Poland versus Germany. You’re not talking a massive (business
policy) difference. When you look at New York versus West Virginia, in terms of
proximity, very close and yet very different for our business… Cultural differences
aren't that big of a factor necessarily because there's more of a difference (in
doing business) between New York and West Virginia than Czech Republic and
Germany while there's probably a bigger cultural difference between Czech
Republic and Germany versus New York and West Virginia.”
The same participant who said the quote above did note that culture does play a role in how
policies are formed. Culture can drive politics and politics drive policy. Apart from policies,
differences like language, religion, or other key cultural signifiers were not important in the
decision-making process. Out of the ranking questions, “similarity to home country” was ranked
as least important by every participant.
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Another participant mentioned that culture can play a more important role in the
management side of international supply chain decision-making,
“A person in Singapore is not going to tell me anything that's going to upset
me. Have you heard of the Hofstede matrix1? So, in practical application, while
maybe it's not 100% perfect in every sense, the person from Singapore is simply
not going to tell me that (which might upset me). That the pressure in the
machine is too high. And this is going to fail. But the young degreed engineer
who's taking us through the plant whose drawing it is and whose product it is, is,
is sitting there going “But that's what I specified”. He's going to keep trying to
run it like that (without adjustment)”
Culture plays a role in how a supply chain manager goes about streamlining their supply-chains.
By virtue of this, it may play a slight role in investment decision-making process, but the
investors and managers are usually different people, so this is probably not too common. Even
the participant who mentioned the quote above downplayed the importance of international
cultural differences in the international supply chain decision-making process.
In review of part 1 of Section 5, it appears, from my sampling of participants, that
endowed factors are more important than government polices like taxation and regulations,
and that these government policies are more important than international cultural differences.
Again, of the factor endowments, the most important were infrastructure, which the

1

“Geert Hofstede, assisted by others, came up with six basic issues that society needs to come to term with in
order to organize itself. These are called dimensions of culture. Each of them has been expressed on a scale that
runs roughly from 0 to 100” (Geerthofstede.com 2021).
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government can play a role in creating and maintaining, and physical proximity to customers
and other parts of the supply chain, which the government cannot control.

Part 2: Decision-Making Processes
The previous section focused on outside international factors that play a role in the
international supply chain investment decision-making process. This section will cover the
strategies and tool that supply chain investment decision makers use. The point is to show how
decisions about supply chain investment are made. Based on the interviews I conducted, this
section will be broken down into three subsections. The first subsection will deal with how
participants talked about the use of business and economic models and technology in their
decision-making. The second subsection will cover the role of intuition and tacit knowledge.
The final section will show how participants understood the role of contracts and especially
relationships in the process of supply chain investment.

Business Models and Technology
This subsection focuses on how participants reported they use strategies and tools in
their decision-making process. The most common strategy/tool talked about were business
models. Business models were consistently ranked highly in the ranking part of the
questionnaire and multiple participants stressed their importance heavily in conversation,

36
“We use a principle called EVA2, which is economic value added. It tells you how
quick you can get a return on the invested capital. It not only measures how fast
but to what level, so we measure all investments and every purchase, over a
certain amount, using the EVA model. So, if we're going to add a warehouse, or
we're going to buy 25 new can inspection cameras, or we're going to build a
plant in Russia, we’re going to still use EVA as the model”
The particular participant who is quoted above stressed the importance of using the EVA model
across the board,
“Whether it's a brand-new investment, whether it is a capacity increase, we use
it, whether we're looking at buying a competitor, or we're looking at buying a
supplier or entering a new business… The same model is used for everything we
do… that's how we look at divestitures as well”
The EVA model was mentioned by almost every participant (including those based in another
country) as being the most important part of their decision-making process. As a model, it is
very similar to the Real Options theory mentioned in Section 2. The only difference is that Real
Options Theory has a more concrete way of quantifying if continuing an investment is a good
idea compared to the EVA model. With that said, the way participants described how they use
the EVA model is interchangeable with Real Options theory. This is especially true because of
how they talked of their processes for divestiture.

2

“Economic Value Added (EVA) or Economic Profit is a measure based on the Residual Income technique that
serves as an indicator of the profitability of projects undertaken. Its underlying premise consists of the idea that
real profitability occurs when additional wealth is created for shareholders and that projects should create returns
above their cost of capital” (Corporate Finance Institute 2021a)
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Other business models were also mentioned as having a role in the decision-making
process:
“Six Sigma3 is standardized in our industry, and everybody uses it. It's basically a
structured approach you use to make sure you use data and analysis to make
decisions.”
Another participant talked of how they adapt a model developed for other purposes to fit the
needs of a supply chain decision-maker:
“Mackenzie has a model which is called a 7S model4. I used the theory of their 7S
model and convert it to a supply chain model.”
Participants consistently mentioned that models are not just numbers and graphs, but that they
encompass a wider range of variables,
“It's not only quantitative or qualitative, it's both.”
A common theme among participants was the idea that using models can help mitigate
uncertainty. Though it is more of a rule of thumb than a model, the idea of diversification and
using many suppliers was universal:

3

“The term Six Sigma refers to a set of quality-control tools that businesses can use to eliminate defects and
improve processes to help boost their profits. It was developed by a scientist in the 1980s while he was working
at Motorola. Six Sigma is a statistical- and data-driven process that works by reviewing limit mistakes or defects.
It emphasizes cycle-time improvements while reducing manufacturing defects to no more than 3.4 occurrences
per million units or events. This means that an error generally occurs with a six-standard deviation event from
the mean because only 3.4 out of a million events along a bell curve would fall outside of six standard deviations”
(Hayes 2021).

4

“The McKinsey 7S Model refers to a tool that analyzes a company’s “organizational design.” The goal of the
model is to depict how effectiveness can be achieved in an organization through the interactions of seven key
elements – Structure, Strategy, Skill, System, Shared Values, Style, and Staff”(Corporate Finance Institute 2021b).
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“The first and foremost (strategy for mitigating uncertainty) that comes to mind,
is really diversifying with your suppliers. You don't want to use one supplier for
100% of anything.”
Another participant said,
“Never had a have a single source, so work with 80/20 or 70/30.”
Several participants noted that they use technology to mitigate uncertainty. Working
with startups is a good way to find new ideas and to make sure that supply chains are
streamlined and stay up to date. Technology paired with big data is also incredibly important
for supply chain procurement and management. One participant said when talking of
procurement data technology:
“(There is) a big matrix of 10 to 20 different factors that go into it when they
onboard a supplier: their capabilities, their reputation. They're a kind of volume
that they can handle, and it all goes into a big matrix, and they're all different,
weighted at different things based on a project”
Another noted:
“There's a lot in terms of software today that does optimization planning and
reducing supply chains. All of those are data driven and take current market
knowledge from freight forwarding companies… So, they've got the data and it's
going to give you accurate lead times etc.”
Related to the last quote above, I made a point of asking participants about the degree
to which industry reports affect their decision-making. Most answered in terms of big data
which inevitably involves business models and technology. Tech is constantly taking in real time
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industry reports and integrating them into specified and contextual models. On the flip side,
one participant talked of industry reports in a different and insightful way,
“I value industry reports…They're filled with absolutely crucial information that
forms the baseline of what good economic thinking and planning on supply chain
should be. If you don't have it, then you're solely reliant on the rumors that you
hear, the things you get from the public trade publications, which may be
running behind. They may not be giving you alerts fast enough. I think it's an
80/20 thing, where 80% of the people ignore them or they look at them once a
week. 20% of the people, they look at it the first thing every day before they ever
do anything… They combine that intimate knowledge that they get with the
market and, eventually, that builds exceptional experience, skill, hunches,
etcetera. A data model in the back of their minds. Yeah, they just automatically
know (what to look for). And if they bite in, they go out and deal with it today as
opposed to waiting for the data to show up tomorrow.”
This quote will bring us to the next subsection which talks of intuition and tacit knowledge in
full. In brief review, supply chain decision-makers express that they value business models and
technology highly. All the participants claimed that most of their decision-making comes from
business models, in particular the EVA model and Six Sigma. The next section will cover how
hunches, a staple study of Behavioral Economics and often the opposite of business models,
factor into their decision-making process.

Intuition and Tacit Knowledge
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This thesis is primarily an exploratory study focused on a particular group. A hallmark of
decision-making and Behavioral Economics research is investigating the role of “hunches”. How
much of the process is based off an educated guess versus a more “rational” way of making
decisions? For this study, I asked supply chain decision-makers a variety of questions related to
hunches. In general, participants were quick to say that hunches played a very small role in
their decision-making process,
“There's very little intuition involved there. There might be a slight amount when
you talk about the intangibles. You know, I would say. A small percentage. Is
based on intuition or speculation. 95 Plus percent is all based on numbers.”
While there is a recognition of intuition in this statement, it is a recognition of a small amount
of intuition that would be made in any decision. Another participant put it frankly,
“The most important factor in supply chain is safety. We make important
decisions that in a lot of cases are life or death and we make big financial
decisions and if you screw up a $10 million decision, you're going to lose your job.
We don't do things based on whims and hunches.”
From these statements, and others that echoed the same sentiment, along with hunches
consistently being ranked lowly in the ranking questionnaire, participants clearly did not see
hunches or intuition as playing a large role in their decision-making process. This makes sense.
Supply chain decision-makers are making a business investment, not a securities investment.
They invest to build a better supply-chain for their company, not just to profit off the
investment. This is a way that supply chain decision-makers are different from a securities
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trader. It appears that supply-chain decision-makers do not rely on hunches as much as
business models and data.
There is one key area of investment that participants did mention where intuition must
play a role. This is in investment into a new product,
“The innovation side is going is a lot more risky and a lot more intuitive.”
A company can do all the preliminary research it wants to, but it can never know for sure if a
new product will sell well. Innovation is indeed risker and does require a higher level of
intuition and reliance on hunches, because unknowns play a bigger role in the decision.
What may be more interesting than the information and conclusions gathered above is
that participants often replied to my questions about hunches or intuition with a key
distinction. They were dismissive and even hostile to the idea of hunches or intuition as
guesswork. They instead brought in a different idea of intuition. Take the following quote,
“Most don't call it intuition; we call it experience. So, what you have is somebody
says, well, wait a minute. We have three plants in Phoenix. We don't want to put
another plant in Phoenix because 15 years ago there was a massive power
outage that affected the western part of that city for 14 hours. That's a good
point, right? Yes, that's kind of an intuition thing, but it's more based on
experience.”
Intuition based on experience is separate from the idea of a hunch. It can almost be described
as background knowledge. This is tacit knowledge. The idea of tacit knowledge is attributed to
scientific philosopher Michael Polanyi who first wrote about it in his book Personal Knowledge
and was expanded in The Tacit Dimension (Polanyi 1962; 2009). Cambridge Dictionary defines it

42
as “knowledge that you do not get from being taught, or from books, etc. but get from personal
experience, for example when working in a particular organization” (Cambridge Dictionary
2021). It is distinct from hunches because it is not simply whims. It is real knowledge, but very
difficult to express. This was clear from the interviews as all participants tried to describe it
(without saying tacit knowledge) but came about it in different ways and often struggled to
clearly define it,
“There's going to be some degree where the numbers look one way, but we feel
like this is still a really good idea. There is some of that, but I don't know that I'd
ever call that intuition.”
and,
“There is a feeling- I wouldn't use the word hunch-but I have a feeling here. A
feeling that's based on what is in my brain with the experience that I had thatit's difficult for me to put into words- but it's not a hunch. It's a feeling based on
what I’ve lived.”
The participants often acknowledged that tacit knowledge is important, yet it is mostly a
jumping off point, or a useful foundation for decisions. They talked of it more as an aid to
making decisions than as a key variable that causes them to invest one way or another. Several
quotes exemplify this sentiment,
“The foundation of every decision you make as a leader needs to be a function of
structured problem-solving using data and costs to make good decisions. Your
intuition and experience are important, but it lies on top of the foundation of
good, structured problem solving”
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Another spoke of how tacit knowledge can be an aid in decision-making,
“The experience helps me know how to react and not to freeze. The experience
helps to be confident… You know the market. You know the people. You know
what to expect. The fact is that you know how the engine works. Experience helps
that.”
A quote that shows tacit knowledge as a start point is the following,
“(Intuition) points you in a direction but not an answer, it's really a jumping off
point to investigate something”
Participants claimed that tacit knowledge is an integral factor in their decision-making
process, but it is not convincing without data and business models to back it up. It helps them
explore new ideas, get a feeling for the market or environment they are investing into, and aids
them in the choice making process. In brief review, participants claimed that simple “hunches”
do not play an important role in the decision-making process and that data, tech, and business
models are more important. They stated that the only area of investment where hunches are
more important is into innovation or new markets. Finally, they suggested that tacit knowledge
is key, but not convincing on its own.

Contracts and Relationships
One last key important combination of factors that go into international supply chain
decision-making is that of contracts and relationships. I included several questions having to do
with flexibility in the questionnaire for participants. I thought that this might be a good way to
talk about incomplete contracts and that area of economic thought, but the questions about
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flexibility just led to conversations about the impact of COVID-19 on international supply
chains. These conversations will be covered in part 3. What is fascinating is that my questions
about contracts led to an aspect of decision-making I had not considered, relationships.
A consistent theme in conversation with participants is that there are two “levels” to
relationships. The first level is the formal contract. This includes the hard numbers and details
of what needs to happen in the relationship between supplier and buyer. The main point of this
level of contract is protection and clarity:
“The individuals writing the contacts contracts get into the level of detail that
creates uniform transparency of understanding.”
This is especially important considering the complexity of international supply chains. Contracts
act as a simple way of ensuring that a supplier and buyer have the same baseline understanding
of what is going on. Contracts are sometimes thought to be constraining, but from what I
gathered from the participants is that there is always some level of flexibility in supply-chain
contracts, especially when dealing with commodity prices and shipping rates. Contracts are only
the baseline. What is interesting is that participants talked of a second level of contracts.
Relationships are what underly contracts. Formal contracts present clarity and give
protection if need be. Informal contracts are the non-legal mutual agreement between buyers
and sellers. “Clauses” in these agreements might be the way discourse is handled, a tolerance
for flexibility if the job gets done, and an acknowledgement that a supplier and buyer can
depend on each other at some level. The following quote summarizes this general idea well,
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“There's a need for better contractual relationships. What I work on with my
clients is not more onerous, laborious contracts, but better relationships. Its's a
relationship game. Contracts support a relationship, not vice versa.”
This quote shows an important distinction. Legal contracts, though formal, are the less
important of the two levels of contract. Relationships are what help build a better supply chain.
One participant put relationships on the same level as business models and data in importance
saying,
“You have to be able to make structured, rational, empirical analytical decisions,
but you've got to be a really good relationship builder. If you have both, you're
going to be successful.”
Participants also noted how good relationships with suppliers acts as a sort of security. If
a supplier knows that they will not be dropped at any better offer, the buyer will have leverage
in the future if the supplier finds a better deal,
“If somebody tried to bump us down and you had a really good relationship with
that supplier, you could pull some strings there to say, “Hey wait a minute I get
that you maybe prioritize us lower, but we need you and here's the reason why
we have more opportunity for you””.
Good relationships open doors and act as a sense of security. Another participant echoed this,
“You're not trying to screw your supplier; you're trying to have a good
relationship so that when the chips are down and you need them, they're there
for you. Conversely, some companies nickel and dime… Now (during the COVID19 Pandemic) they're screwed.”
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One last way that relationships were said to be important is that they add another level
of data. It is not hard numbers and facts, but a softer type of data which is sometimes
important. Rumors, tips, warnings, and inside information can often be important to
procurement decision-makers and supply chain managers. This information is not accessible
public, only through knowing people well and being trusted by them. One participant described
it this way:
“Person to person connectivity to build relationships that surpass data alone with
superior insights at a macro level”
In review of this subsection on the impact of contracts and relationships on the
decision-making of international supply chain investors, it appears that relationships are of key
importance. They are the foundation of contractual relationships. Contracts are only a formal
and supporting aspect of a relationship. Relationships provide security in supply chains, open
new doors, and allow for access to a different type of data than is readily and publicly available.

Part 3: Flexibility and COVID-19
For a thesis written during 2021-2022, it was obvious that a section related to the
COVID-19 pandemic should be included. This section is relatively short and different from the
last two, but is necessary, nonetheless. I included several questions in the questionnaire for
participants related to COVID-19 and much of the conversations surrounding flexibility are
intrinsically linked to the supply chain shock, buildups, and bottlenecks that have occurred since
March 2020.
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The most common theme across the board regarding participants’ views of COVID-19’s
impact on international supply chains was that it is a temporary issue that exacerbated existing
issues in supply chains:
“COVID-19 is kind of opening people's eyes to the importance of supply chains.
But you know some of the fundamental problems with supply chain existed
before. Shortage of truck drivers, the way manufacturing works, the way
sourcing works, the way logistics works, balancing public and private good,
impacts on the environment. All these things were wrong (before the pandemic.)”
and,
“The impact of COVID is a trigger for the inability of today's supply chain to do
what it needs to do.”
When it comes to how participants have changed their strategy due to the pandemic, a
few participants, in particular the participant operating in South America, claimed that they
have focused their supply chains more domestically, or in foreign countries closer to their home
country,
“I tend to have more domestic suppliers closer to me, around the corner, so that
we don't have issues with freight or shipping, trucks, country borders. I tend think
that everyone is.”
When I asked participants questions about flexibility in supply chains, the conversation
often turned to issues regarding breakdowns during COVID-19. What participants generally said
about flexibility is that supply chains were already quite flexible before the pandemic, but that
issues with shipping were already becoming more common; COVID-19 just made them worse:
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“Everything today that we do has to have inherent flexibility, and I would say that
we were like that before COVID, but we're definitely like that now because there's
this whole situation that occurred that no one ever thought of. What's the next
thing we haven't thought of?”
Participants also made a point of saying that larger buffers are not the best or only answer to
the supply chain crisis. It was also noted that adding more buffers is easier said than done:
“I think they're limited (in terms of flexibility) by their capital.”
A quote that shows a participant’s view of the downside of buffers is the following:
“What happens is you get overstocked with goods that no one wants. In a society
that values eliminating waste, material waste, I don't see us really getting rid of
(nimble supply chains).”
One participant offered an insightful opinion into what they believe the future of supply
chain flexibility will look like,
“I think that nimble supply chains, what manufacturers and producers are going
to ultimately look at, is being able to convert from doing A to doing B. I'm an
alcohol distiller, and next month I'm making hand sanitizer.”
In their view, true flexibility will be in increasing the capabilities of supply chains. If supply
chains are capable of multiple purposes, then they will be able to meet demand in a better and
more timely way. This will add greater flexibility to the system at large and help mitigate the
blockages such as the ones we saw during the COVID-19 pandemic.
In review of participants’ views of the impact of COVID-19 on international supply chains
and their views on the future of supply chain flexibility, I was able to obtain several insights. The
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first was that COVID-19 did not drastically chain the supply chain philosophies of participants. It
just highlighted the existing problems in international supply chains. Participants claimed that
more flexibility in supply chains is a good idea, but companies are limited by capital if they
attempt to do this with larger buffers. Finally, participants noted that increased flexibility will
come by making supply chains increasingly multifaceted, not from buffers alone.
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Section 6: Assessment and Conclusion
In this brief and final section, I do a few things. I first assess the three hypotheses that I
presented in Section 4. It is worth noting that these hypotheses were used more as a jumping
off point. They informed the type of research I undertook and certainly the questions I asked
participants. The nature of this project is exploratory. While I accept and reject different
hypothesis, I am not claiming these to be true or untrue across the board or even for the
majority of international supply chain decision-makers. In the context of an honors thesis, it
was simply not possible to do the type of research necessary to make such claims. I next point
out a few areas I believe would be interesting areas for further research into international
supply chain decision-making. Finally, I present some conclusions.

Assessment of Hypotheses
In Section 4 I laid out three hypotheses. These were (i) that participants would follow
“gut feelings” to a significant degree, (ii) that participants would rely heavily on data and
business models, or (iii) that participants would synthesize the two.
I reject the first hypothesis. From the interviews, it was clear that participants were
firmly opposed to the idea of recklessly following hunches. Most participants were even hostile
to this idea. Whenever they said that they did follow intuition, they qualified it in such a way
that it fit the definition of tacit knowledge better than “gut feelings”.
My second and third hypotheses I accept but qualify them both. It was clear from the
interviews that data and business models were the most important piece of the decisionmaking process for all participants. Because of this it is a hypothesis worthy of acceptance. I
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qualify it only because other important non-quantitative variables were also quite important to
participants. This is where I accept the third hypothesis. It is qualified in that participants did
not rely on “gut feelings”, but on intuition characterized as tacit knowledge. Another key area
of importance that my hypotheses did not cover is that of relationships. Relationships appear to
be the third important piece of international supply chain decision-making.

Areas for Further Research
I believe there are three areas that, after having done this research, I believe would be
beneficial to study further. I also believe that an additional type of research would be beneficial.
My research was based on semi-structured interviews. These produced rich and qualitative
evidence of how international supply chain decision-makers understand their own decisionmaking processes. An important further step would be to examine whether decision-makers
truly do behave as they describe, one that empirically studies supply chain decision-makers as
they are making real-time decisions.
Moving on to three areas of further research that my study suggests, I have not seen
any research that touches on the importance of tacit knowledge in international supply chain
decision-making. Tacit knowledge is a subject that tends to be under-studied in decision-making
science at large, and in particular, economic decision-making science. A second area of research
suggested by my study’s findings is that of the importance of relationships in supply chain
decision-making. Do good relationships between suppliers and buyers create better supply
chain outcomes? That is a potentially very fruitful research question. Finally, the last area
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where further research should be done relates to how has COVID-19 has impacted international
supply chain decision-making.

Conclusion
It was clear to me from the outset of this project that international supply chains are an
understudied and undertheorized topic in economics and international relations. They have
massive implications for both fields, but not much has been written about them, especially
regarding decision-making. I am guessing this will change in the coming months and years as
supply chains become more visible due to current supply-chain circumstances. The decisionmakers I talked with know that supply chains are not well understood by the lay or academic
community. Because of this, they were very open and excited to share information about their
professional field. One piece of data that I learned from this research process that I did not
report in my findings is that supply chain decision-makers tend to be decent people. They
thoroughly believe that being decent and considerate is rewarded in their profession and
creates better outcomes. The importance of good relationships and being an understanding
person was frequently referred to by my interviewees. Good research is supposed to be
generalizable. If anything that I uncovered from my research is generalizable, then it is this last
key finding. The world at large should learn from it.
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